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IN (SLIGHTLY UNCOMFORTABLE) DEFENSE 
OF “TRIAGE” BY PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
John B. Mitchell * 
Since the mid-1970’s when I first read Professor Freedman’s article 
on The Three Hardest Questions,1 I have been a fan.  Following his work 
from then to now, I have always appreciated how he truly understands 
the complex reality of the trial courts and the world of those attorneys 
who work in that system, that he always espouses the ethical high 
ground within that reality, and that he is willing to make tough, even 
controversial, stances regarding what he believes is right.  In An Ethical 
Manifesto for Public Defenders,2 I find my theory of triage3 as the object of 
Professor Freedman’s ethical disapproval.4 
Given what I have already said, it should not be surprising that I 
agree with most of what Professor Freedman writes concerning the ills of 
criminal public defense.  Public defense is terribly under funded,5 with 
Public Defenders carrying staggeringly high caseloads.6  I further agree 
that, while Gideon v. Wainwright7 does not guarantee an attorney as 
talented and with as many supporting resources as the wealthiest client 
could retain,8 Gideon does guarantee an attorney with both the requisite 
skills and sufficient time to employ those unique skills.   
Finally, I agree that in Strickland v. Washington,9 the United States 
Supreme Court effectively ensured that Sixth Amendment Constitutional 
guarantees will play no role in either enforcing basic levels of attorney 
competence or in even recognizing the reality of institutional defense 
players.  Mocking Gideon, the Strickland court mixes a “presumption” of 
competence,10 an onerous two-part test (under which you functionally 
                                                     
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, J.D. 1970, Stanford Law 
School. 
 The author wishes to thank Phyllis Brazier for her fabulous word processing under a 
very tight time table. 
1 Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). 
2 Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV 911 
(2005) [hereinafter Manifesto]. 
3 See, John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215 (1994). 
4 Freedman, Manifesto, supra note 2, at 914-18. 
5 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1218 n.11, 1219 n.19. 
6 Id., at 1241 n.96. 
7 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
8 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1254, 1286 n.214. 
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
10 Id. at 689, 690. 
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have to demonstrate you would have been acquitted but for the 
incompetence),11 a refusal to incorporate ABA standards into 
constitutional standards for competence,12 and de facto the removal of 
anything that can be characterized as “strategic” (even if seemingly 
stupid) from consideration in a Sixth Amendment analysis.13  The result 
is one that, even in the best light, can be seen as totally abdicating the 
responsibility for public defense attorney competence under the Sixth 
Amendment, and placing it on local bar associations and law schools 
(which, of course, cannot order county councils or state legislatures to 
address competence issues tied to inadequate resources).  Taking a less 
generous view, Strickland insures a “cover-up” of the unjustifiable under 
funding of public defense. 
Where Professor Freedman and I differ is in our approach to this 
shameful reality.  Professor Freedman would have public defenders take 
the system head on, if necessary heroically going down fighting like the 
ancient Greeks at Thermopylae.14 
In contrast, I consider myself an “optimistic realist”:  I hope for a 
better world, while planning for the one we have.  And it is this present 
world that my ideas about triage address. 
Unlike private practice, where additional resources can be added in 
response to additional client funds (including adding associates, contract 
attorneys, and paralegals),15 public defense is a zero-sum game.  
Whatever resources are added to one public defense client’s defense will 
not be available to another.16  And significant additional public funds are 
simply not forthcoming to increase the public defense pie.17  I, therefore, 
am back to square one; i.e., triage.18 
                                                     
11 Id. at 695-96. 
12 Id. at 688-89. 
13 Id. at 699. 
14 The heroic stand of the Spartans against an overwhelming Persian Force is recounted 
in THE HISTORY OF HERODOTUS (translated by George Rawlinson), in GREAT BOOKS 253, 
¶ 207 (1996). 
15 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1244. 
16 Though, in fact, all lawyering involves some rationing. Id. at 1243. 
17 In fact, the entire criminal justice system is starved for resources.  Id. at 1218 n.12. 
18 Moreover, even if additional public funds earmarked for hiring dozens of new public 
defenders magically appeared and, therefore, significantly reduced caseloads were a 
reality, public defenders would still need to ration their “credibility”.  While a private 
practitioner can come into court every week or so extolling their particular client’s virtues, 
even with a dramatically reduced caseload a public defender cannot make the same claim 
for each of their five-to-ten clients each day, day after day.  Id. at 1244. 
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Given Professor Freedman and my strong areas of congruence, I 
want to limit my response to the following three specific points of 
divergence: 
1) It is possible that, noble intentions aside, if put into action 
Professor Freedman’s proposal would trigger a variety of 
institutional responses actually harmful to existing criminal 
defendants. 
2) Even if Professor Freedman’s ethical mandate was implemented 
and successful, there would be a time of transition during which 
public defenders would still need to engage in triage. 
3) Finally, my notion of “pattern representation” is far more 
involved and effective than represented in Professor Freedman’s 
article. 
A. Following Professor Freedman’s Course of Action, Public Defenders Could 
in Fact Prompt Institutional Responses Harmful to Criminal Defendant 
Played out within a system with two powerful institutional players 
other than the public defenders, judges and prosecutors, it is not clear 
that Professor Freedman’s most sincere intentions will actually inure to 
the benefit of criminal defendants.  Let me focus on Professor 
Freedman’s stance on the overloaded public defender and plea 
bargaining.  As we are all aware, at least 90% of cases are resolved 
without any trial by some form of plea bargain.19  These bargains then 
are effectively sealed from review by the ritual of the plea litany (i.e., 
putting on the record that the defendant recognizes all the constitutional 
rights she is waiving).20  This obviously is not a mechanism that judges 
or prosecutors want to see interfered with in any significant way. 
In this plea-bargaining realm, Professor Freedman requires a public 
defender who believes she has too many cases to competently represent 
each client to convey any plea offers by the prosecution,21 but to then tell 
the client that she cannot advise the client about the deal, because she is 
incompetent to do so.22  If the client decides to nonetheless take the plea, 
                                                     
19 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1228 n.52. 
20 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (stating the Court must inform the defendant 
of constitutional Rights being waived by pleading guilty and defendant must waive rights 
on record).  See also, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (detailing the procedure for accepting pleas in 
Federal Court). 
21 Freedman, Manifesto, supra note 2, at 922. 
22 Id. 
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the public defender must put on the record of the plea hearing that 
counsel did not advise the client because she was incompetent to do so 
due to her caseload.23   
Will judges and prosecutors feel shame at seeing such a pure display 
of ethical integrity24 and join the public defenders in a Gideon love fest?  
Not necessarily.  Prosecutors might respond with a form of 
brinkmanship akin to going “all-in” in a game of Texas Hold-em poker.  
While prosecutors depend on plea bargaining to stay on top of their own 
caseloads, in the short run they hold a great deal of power over 
individual defendants.  This is particularly so when the deal on the table 
is dramatically better than the sentence the defendant reasonably could 
receive after conviction at trial, or when the crime reduction offered by 
the prosecutor has far less stigma than the charged crime (e.g., amend 
complaint to add theft, defendant pleads to theft, armed robbery 
dismissed).  Whether or not the defendant is out of custody on bail will 
be another factor weighing in on the prosecutor’s power in any 
particular case.  This is especially so when the prosecutor is ready to 
offer a deal of “time served,” and a plea will thus be followed by 
immediate release from custody. 
Given this power, once the prosecutor realizes what the public 
defender is doing, he may simply refuse to bargain.  “I’m not making 
any offer.  There’s no point.  If you refuse to advise your client, your 
client has not received competent representation.  While reversal still 
may not be required under Strickland because your client will not be able 
to show prejudice, I really don’t feel like taking the chance.  In fact, I 
think you have the obligation to tell your client that he has the choice of 
representing himself under Faretta,25 and if he does, he can bargain with 
me face to face.” 
                                                     
23 Id.  
24 At a minimum, Professor Freedman’s requirements for ethical action by  public 
defenders can only be institutionally meaningful if the entire public defenders office stands 
together on the contention that their caseloads prevent representation that would satisfy 
the Sixth Amendment.  Otherwise, the one or two public defenders who stand up will be 
reassigned out of criminal trial courts, put on leave, or fired.  Professor Freedman 
recognized this, but believes that being a professional means putting your responsibilities 
to your client “above your own financial concerns”.  Id. at 922 n.75.  To me that seems a 
disproportionate price for accomplishing no more than being able to say you did the right 
thing.  Others, on the other hand, may feel that that is all that matters. 
25 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding a criminal defendant has a 
constitutional right to represent himself). 
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What is the client to do now?  The defendant has no constitutional 
right to a plea bargain26 and, in fact, any agreement under these 
circumstances would appear to violate the Sixth Amendment.  Of course, 
the defendant could waive her right to counsel and take the deal; but 
self-representation is as far away from the promise of Gideon as one can 
imagine.  On the other hand, the defendant could force the issue and go 
to trial, but she would face all the risks attendant with the possibility of a 
conviction, as well as one additional problem.  Who would defend her?  
If the public defender is not even competent to advise her on the plea 
bargain, it is hard to imagine how that same attorney suddenly could be 
competent to actually represent the client in a jury trial.  The client could 
just “plead to the sheet” (i.e., plead to all charges) and rely on the mercy 
of the court and/or some sentencing “discount” for pleading to give a 
lower sentence than would be given after conviction at trial, but it is 
difficult to locate the promise of Gideon in this scenario. 
Similarly, if the public defender faces down the court, putting on the 
record that she did not advise the client on the deal because she was 
incompetent to do so due to her caseload, the judge simply will refuse to 
accept the bargain.  After all, the common form of the plea literacy is 
“has your attorney advised you that [court then lists rights being 
waived]?”  If the client protests at the court’s refusal to accept the plea, 
will the judge tell her about her right to self-representation?  Or will the 
court bring in private attorneys from the conflicts panel, and perhaps 
even get some emergency funds to pay a panel of attorneys with little or 
no criminal defense experience, to do some perfunctory interviewing 
and discovery review (with investigation in an unusual case) in order to 
advise clients and get the plea system back on track?  If that happens, all 
that will be accomplished is that many defendants will remain in jail27 
                                                     
26 In fact, a few jurisdictions have forbidden plea bargaining in most circumstances.  See, 
e.g., Michael L. Rubinstein & Teresa J. White, Alaska’s Ban on Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 367 (1979). 
27 While under normal circumstances, state speedy trial rules would prevent extensive 
pretrial incarceration, all those rules have “safety valves “that allow extension of speedy 
trial timeframes if good cause reasons (out of control of the court and prosecutor) prevent 
getting the trial commenced in time.  See, e.g., WASH. CT. R., CRLJ (d)(8) (West 2004) 
(“When a trial is not begun on the date set because of unavoidable or unforseeable 
circumstances beyond the control of the court or the parties the court, even if the time for 
trial has expired, may extend the time within which the trial must be held. . . .”).  A sudden 
revolt by all public defenders would plainly constitute such good cause, at least until 
reasonable, alternative representation can be arranged.  Of course, realistically one would 
expect all this to initially be preceded by an emergency meeting called by the judges with 
the heads of the public defenders office, where some minor concessions would have been 
offered and rejected. 
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awaiting a visit by an attorney likely far less competent than their public 
defender. 
Finally, imagine what it would be like for a client if her attorney told 
her that the attorney is not competent and will not give any legal advice 
about the plea offer.  What is the client to make of this?  To begin with, 
clients tend not to trust public defenders anyway, thinking that they are 
part of the system and not competent.28  Now their attorney actually 
confesses incompetence, and refuse to help the client.  This is a parody of 
the worst image indigent clients have of public defenders.  
Appropriately, the client should respond, “Why do I even have you as 
an attorney if you aren’t even going to help me? . . . I want another 
attorney.  I want an attorney who will help me!”  Of course, Professor 
Freedman’s attorney will have to respond:  “There is no other attorney 
who will do anything different.  Our entire office is committed to doing 
the same.  Let me explain why. Even though it might be against your 
best interest in your particular case, all of us in this office are doing this 
because . . .”  So, if the client is at all rational and self-interested, they will 
insist that they go back to court with their “attorney” and seek the 
court’s help.  Assuming again a system-wide stance by the entire public 
defender’s office, the court will have no choice but to call in the panels of 
experienced and inexperienced attorneys I’ve just discussed.  In the end, 
the clients are unlikely to feel part of some noble struggle on behalf of 
the Sixth Amendment.  Instead they are likely to believe that they are 
nothing but pawns in some “game” between the public defender, 
prosecution and judges, and only feel further disillusionment towards 
the criminal justice system. 
B. Even if Professor Freedman’s Position Were Successfully Implemented, 
During the Inevitable Transition Public Defenders Would Still Need to 
Practice Triage of the Type I Have Suggested 
Let’s imagine that society’s legal and political institutions positively 
responded to an unbending phalanx of public defenders standing by the 
letter of their ethical code.  The response could take a variety of forms 
that, singularly or in combination, result in substantially lower caseloads 
for individual public defenders.  Initially, there are only two basic 
strategies to accomplish this end:  more public defenders and/or fewer 
overall cases in the system.  The former merely requires more public 
funds to hire more public defenders.  The latter could be accomplished 
through a mix of legislative decriminalization of certain crimes, more 
                                                     
28 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1216, 1216 n.7, 1227-28. 
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robust prosecution screening of cases for filing, and even alteration of 
police arrest priorities on the street. 
Whether this victory for the promise of Gideon results from legal 
fiat,29 or the more likely avenue of institutional negotiations with the 
public defender’s office, it is difficult to see how a sudden caseload 
ceiling of, e.g., no more than “X” felonies or “Y” misdemeanors could 
immediately go into effect.  Lowering the number of cases per attorney 
does not change the fact that the system is already filled with criminal 
defendants (many who are in jail because they cannot make bail), with 
more entering every day.  Who will represent all these defendants who 
formerly would have been added to some public defender’s 
backbreaking caseload? 
The courts could fill the ranks of public defenders to meet this gap in 
the transition by “drafting” members of the bar under a theory of 
mandatory pro bono.30  Legal challenges to this action under claims of 
involuntary servitude and taking without compensation aside,31 this 
dramatic action would likely suffer from two problems.  First, elected 
state judges might hesitate to conscript transactional lawyers from large 
corporate law firms; while to only troll the ranks of small and solo 
practitioners, leaving the large firms alone, would  be certain to have 
instant political, if not legal, ramifications.  Secondly, and more 
importantly, most of the new attorneys thrown into the fray would know 
almost nothing about the criminal justice system, criminal procedure, or 
criminal litigation.  “I know you’ve watched Law & Order, so here’s a 
robbery case where the defendant is facing five-to-life.  Go get ‘em.”   
                                                     
29 Unless relying on independent state constitutional grounds, courts are not likely to 
find automatic violations of the Sixth Amendment based solely on caseloads.  The 
Strickland analysis requires a showing of actual prejudice, a determination that must be 
made on a case-by-case basis.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  While 
Professor Freedman characterizes the caseload problem as one of a “conflict of interest,” 
and true conflict of interest brought to the trial court’s attention does constitute per se 
incompetence, it is difficult to imagine a court making this determination by relying solely 
on some bright line numeric quantum of cases.  Freedman, Manifesto, supra note 2, at 920; 
see Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978).  Such a caseload, when added to 
concrete testimony by an individual public defender might, on the other hand, be sufficient 
for a legal ruling of incompetence in a particular case. 
30 See Patrick Harris, Let’s Make Lawyers Happy:  Advocating Mandatory Pro Bono, N. ILL. 
U.L. REV. 287 (1999) (providing a good outline of the grounds justifying mandatory pro 
bono). 
31 See Jennifer Murray, Lawyers Do It for Free?: An Examination of Mandatory Pro Bono, 29, 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1141, 1157-63 (1998) (offering a discussion of the constitutional claims 
against mandatory pro bono. 
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Even if the court decided not to pursue the path of mandatory pro 
bono,  instead obtaining emergency funds from state or local government 
to offer money to members of the bar to “take on a few clients,” this 
problem of competent representation would not be solved, and might in 
fact even be exacerbated.  For the attorneys who would be drawn to 
what would like be relatively small fees would largely be comprised of 
beginning attorneys trying to get some experience and volume practices 
that carefully calculate time spent to remuneration.   
Alternatively, the court and prosecutor could decide that they will 
deal with the gap between the number of existing defendants, and 
available public defenders (given the new caseload caps), by dismissing 
“without prejudice” a sufficient number of “less serious” cases.  
Incoming cases could similarly be controlled by not filing the less serious 
cases.  (The prosecutor would then have the term of the Statute of 
Limitations to subsequently file or refile.)   But that’s still a great number 
of fairly serious criminal cases not being processed.  Would police then 
stop arresting for a significant number of crimes because they know that 
they will not be charged?  Will word then get out on the streets that you 
can commit certain crimes with impunity?   Also, if we are not willing to 
give a permanent free pass from prosecution to all the legitimate cases 
that either were not filled or were dismissed “without prejudice,” these 
cases represent a large backlog of cases.  Even when the public 
defender’s resources are finally at a level that Professor Freedman would 
find properly reflective of Gideon, this as yet uncharged backlog would 
threaten to again swap the system. 
Therefore, one would expect that any mandatory to cap on public 
defender caseloads, whether as the result of legal decision or 
institutional negotiation, will take the form of a target that is achieved at 
the end of set of checkpoints in a staged timetable.  That means that for a 
significant period of time (at least months) public defender caseloads 
will not be likely to dramatically change.  That means triage—focus and 
“pattern representation”. 
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C. A Careful Look at “Pattern Representation” as Competent Representation 
In my system of triage for the lower criminal courts,32 public 
defenders would allocate their limited resources between those cases on 
which they would focus33 and those that would be provided pattern 
representation.34  While I equate focus with the work of good attorneys 
with reasonable caseloads, it is not a quantifiable resource.  It is rather a 
commitment of mental resources that, depending on how the actual case 
unfolds, may be employed every step of the way through trial or may 
never even be called upon (such as when the prosecutor chooses to 
dismiss early in the process).  It is my contention that “pattern 
representation” for those cases not chosen for focus nevertheless can 
constitute basic, competent representation under the Sixth Amendment. 
It is that contention that is the target of Professor Freedman’s strong 
disagreement with my theory of triage. 
There are a number of aspects of my concept of pattern 
representation that I now see I must make clearer, and I take full 
responsibility for any misunderstandings by others reading my previous 
work.  I believe that pattern representation, if done correctly, can satisfy 
the constitution; but not because it would satisfy the Strickland standard.  
Of course it would satisfy Strickland, since it seems possible that 
consulting an Ouija-board for strategic decisions could pass 
constitutional muster under that case.  Rather, pattern representation 
satisfies Gideon because it is not “perfunctory”,35 a matter of just going 
through a ritualized set of motions.  Nor is it a “hasty label and 
bargaining without investigation and research.”36  Pattern representation 
does not mean a glance through the police report, then a plea. 
Pattern representation does begin with the police report because, 
while often not providing an accurate account of the defendant’s story, 
                                                     
32 When I wrote my triage article, my specific concern was with the lower misdemeanor 
courts, and the fact that these courts did not work.  I only focused on public defenders as 
one “piece” of that system (in addition to prosecutors with their charging and plea 
bargaining power, and judges).  Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1215, 1222-23.  I therefore did not 
consider the superior courts and felony cases.  In contrast to most misdemeanors, all 
felonies are “serious” and tend to be factually more complex than misdemeanors (in the 
sense that, except for DUI cases, forensic expert witnesses are rare in the lower courts, and 
that there generally is far more police investigation and, correspondingly, often more 
witnesses).  If applied to felonies, my concept of “pattern representation” must be adjusted 
accordingly, which I have not yet endeavored to do. 
33 Id. at 1302-18. 
34 Id. at 1293-02. 
35 Freedman, Manifesto, supra note 2, at 914. 
36 Id. at 918. 
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the police report does provide a generally decent view of the 
prosecution’s case.  So a “pattern” view of the police report allows a 
competent advocate to quickly see potential case theories and spot 
potential legal issue for possible motions.  From this, the public defender 
can quickly construct the contours (including a “list” of significant 
factual variables that must be determined) of a “reasonable doubt” case; 
i.e., case focused on the prosecution’s case and its high burden of proof.  
Professor Freedman mistakenly equates my notion of pattern 
representation with the tendency of judges in the inquisitorial system to 
jump to early judgments, which then tend to lead the judges to discount 
subsequent information inconsistent with their initial view of the case.37  
While there may be come cognitive relationship between this process 
and my notion of pattern representation, they are very different. The 
cognitive phenomenon Professor Freedman is discussing concerning 
judges in the inquisitorial system would be familiar to any of those who 
analyze the decision making processes of fact finders under the lens of 
narrative38 or schema theory.39  Under these theories, jurors make sense 
of trial testimony by placing it into cognitive structures (schema theory) 
that we call “stories” (narrative theory).40  From the moment when the 
jurors arrive at their chosen story as to what happened, jurors select 
subsequent information consistent with their story, and ignore or 
discount subsequent information that is inconsistent.41   This is precisely 
what was happening with the inquisitorial judges Professor Freedman 
discusses. 
Unlike this cognitive process of fact finders at trial, when engaging 
in pattern representation I am not making judgments about “what 
happened.”  I am retrieving what are in effect checklists stored in my 
expert schema for the particular type of case (although the items on the 
“checklist” are likely to take the form of factual scenarios that I “see,” 
rather than some two-dimensional list.)  Admittedly, the patterns I see 
will limit the checklist(s) I retrieve, and the content of each checklist in 
turn will be limited by my prior experience, education, imagination, 
discussions with colleagues,and such; yet these patterns are nonetheless 
                                                     
37 Id. at 915. 
38 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1043 (1991); 
Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1305 n.253. 
39 See, e.g., Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema:  Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. 
REV. 273 (1989). 
40 Lance Bennett & Martha Feldman, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM 
(1981). 
41 See Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making:  
The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 521, 525 (1991). 
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the tools of an expert advocate, not the judgmental process of a fact 
finder. 
Thus, for example, if a young public defender tells me that she has 
her first case involving a car, passengers, and constructive possession of 
a baggie of marijuana found in the car, I quickly “see” a range of options, 
issues, lines of questioning and arguments that she will struggle to 
construct absent a great deal of preparation.  It’s not that I’m so smart; I 
just have a great deal of information stored, organized, and retrievable 
from my expert schema that is triggered by recognizing the patterns 
raised by this scenario.42  And employing these patterns, I will do 
motions, discovery, and investigation; albeit pin-pointed and limited by 
the particular pattern. 
• Why did the police stop the car?  How did they eventually find 
the drugs?  [I might be able to bring a suppression motion for a 
Fourth Amendment violation.] 
• Whose car was it?  To whom is it registered?  Who was driving?  
[If my client is a passenger, the prosecution’s case is more 
vulnerable; if he’s a hitchhiker, even better.] 
• Where were the drugs found? Console?  Glove box?  Trunk? 
Under a seat?  In the open?  [This is relevant to my client’s 
knowledge, access and control.] 
• Does anything tie my client to the drugs beside mere proximity?  
Fingerprints on baggie?  Drugs on his person?  Paraphernalia, 
rolling papers, etc. on his person?  Client appears under 
influence of drugs?  Smell of drugs in car?  [Absence of these 
“ties” weakens prosecution’s case for dominion and control; 
presence of any of these makes case less triable.] 
• How did the client behave with the police?  Cooperative?  
Uncooperative? “Furtive” as police approached?  
[Circumstantial evidence adding to the guilt or innocence side of 
the scale.] 
                                                     
42 While this is difficult for inexperienced new attorneys, as the result of Clinics, 
Externships, and bar rules permitting actual practice by supervised law students, new 
attorneys are entering the practice with far more real world experience than their 
predecessors.  As such, they have amassed a growing repertoire of patterns. 
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• Any obvious problems with the forensic lab, or required 
certifications in the lab reports?  [You never know.] 
• Has your client or anyone else in the car made a statement?  [If 
your client has made a harmful statement, are there Fourth 
Amendment or Miranda43 lines of attack available?  If a co-
defendant is turning on your client, is there a “deal” and/or 
criminal history you can use to impeach the witness?] 
Using this approach, a competent attorney can give a decent defense.44  
Most of the answers to the factual variables (e.g., where the drugs were 
found) can be found by reviewing the police report and attached 
statements, through information obtained by a discovery motion created 
on computer form  or provided in “open file” discovery, and/or from a 
telephone conversation with the police (they often have very weird 
hours).  If the officer adds incriminating information not in the report 
(e.g., she smelled marijuana in the car), I can impeach based on this 
serious “omission” from the original report. 
Pattern representation cannot make “winners” out of “losers.”  You 
need focus to do that.  But, again, I believe it is competent.  In fact, it is 
precisely because of these patterns in a public defender’s repertoire, 
which then are used in conjunction with their knowledge of the local 
system, their awareness of the likely range of deals in particular types of 
case situations, and their personal experience with individual 
prosecutors and judges, that public defenders tend to do at least as well 
for their clients as private defense attorneys.45 
D. Conclusion 
Everyday when I skim through the paper it’s the same.  The states 
have no money to build new public schools, no money for teachers, no 
money for graduate schools, no money for social services, no money for 
repairing worn-out infrastructure, no money for police, no money for 
homeland security.  Defense of the indigent criminally accused surely 
falls far, far below any of these areas on the list of community concerns.  
Even if public defender after public defender poured gasoline on 
themselves and lighted themselves on fire in open court in dramatic 
                                                     
43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
44 Interestingly, prosecutors often have detailed manuals laying out a pattern-like 
approach to litigating particular types of cases,  including common legal issues, witnesses 
to call, and a list of questions to ask the witnesses on direct examination. 
45 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 57. 
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protest, I do not believe that substantial resources would be forthcoming.  
That means triage.  The only question is whether it will be conducted 
haphazardly, or according to some set of rational principles based on 
ethical theory. 
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